Monday, March 24, 2014

You Open For Him an excerpt from the Passover Haggada



During Peasach (Passover) we tell the next generation the story of our people, the story of our tradition.
We tell the Passover story, to open for him/her (the child that does not know how to ask questions) the door to our tradition, to our family story.
This beautiful poem by a modern Israeli poet, Rivekah Miriam, tries to captures this.



You Open For Him

You open for him
when he is too short to open
you lift him to your shoulders
and soothe him with “don’t be afraid”
open for him slowly, with unaccustomed openings
‘til now he imagined that everything was open
the  walls, he imagined, were as open and transparent as the breeze
the walls, he imagined, as were as open eyed as a patient plain, yawning
he recognized neither lintel nor doorposts
neither hinge nor door
you lift him so that he rubs his sides against the doorposts
so that he bows his head underneath the lintel
gently you  set him on the threshold
so that he his sure footed, not like a refugee
standing on the doorsill.

Rivekah Miriam, Israeli poet from Jerusalem
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Friday, March 21, 2014

Before Abbas recognizes the Jewish state, Israel must define it

Before Abbas recognizes the Jewish state,
Israel must define it
Is it Netanyahu and Lieberman’s Jewish state that alienates its Arab citizens, or Yitzhak Rabin’s inclusive Jewish state that dedicated itself, briefly, to true equality?
By Peter Beinart | Mar. 19, 2014 |

I have a suggestion for Mahmoud Abbas. The next time Benjamin Netanyahu demands that you recognize Israel as a “Jewish state,” tell him that you’ll agree on one condition. The Israeli cabinet must first agree on what “Jewish state” means. That should get you off the hook for a good long while.
Israel has never been able to define the term “Jewish state.” That’s part of the reason it lacks a constitution. Nor, I suspect, can the leaders of Hillel, even though they urge local chapters to make supporting “a Jewish state” a litmus test for potential speakers.
In truth, there are as many definitions of “Jewish state” as there are definitions of “Jew.” For simplicity’s sake, let’s describe two, and imagine how Abbas might respond were Netanyahu to actually define the concept he’s asking the Palestinian leader to endorse.
Jewish State Number One rests on the conviction that given Jewish history, Jews need a state that safeguards Jewish life. To ensure that the state upholds this mission, Jews must maintain political power. And maintaining Jewish political power trumps pretty much everything else.
Such a state works aggressively to keep its non-Jewish population low and politically weak. It denies citizenship even to non-Jewish refugees fleeing extreme persecution. To prevent its Palestinian population from growing, it denies citizenship to West Bank Palestinians married to Israeli citizens. It delights in policies that reduce the birthrate among Palestinian citizens of Israel, as Netanyahu did in 2007, when as finance minister he noted that cuts in child welfare payments had had the “positive” effect of sparking “a dramatic drop in the birth rate” of the “non-Jewish public.” Such a state seriously considers redrawing Israel’s border so as to deposit Israel’s Palestinian citizens outside the state without their consent, as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman famously proposed. It, of course, denies any Palestinians who left Israel during its war of independence the ability to return.
In addition to numerically limiting Israel’s non-Jewish population, Jewish State Number One limits their political influence. On ideological grounds, it seeks to ban Palestinian Israeli parties from running for the Knesset, as Lieberman’s associates have done. It insists that to be legitimate, governing coalitions must enjoy a Jewish parliamentary majority.
Given his actions, and the actions of his political allies, it’s pretty clear that this is the kind of Jewish state Netanyahu wants. It is a state from which Israel’s Palestinian citizens feel understandably alienated. And it’s a state that mocks the promise in Israel’s Declaration of Independence of “complete equality of social and political rights…irrespective of religion, race or sex.”
Were I Mahmoud Abbas, I’d say again and again that Jews have a profound historical connection to the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and the right to live safely in any part of it. But if Netanyahu asked me to endorse Jewish State Number One, I’d tell him to stick it where the sun don’t shine.
Then there’s Jewish State Number Two. It starts with the same conviction: that given Jewish history, Jews need a state that safeguards Jewish life. It too acknowledges the value of Jewish political power, and even endorses non-coercive measures, like the promotion of aliyah, which boost Jewish numbers. But because it considers the state’s democratic character as important as its Jewish character, it rejects any measures that undermine the rights and dignity of Israel’s non-Jewish citizens.
When faced with brutalized asylum seekers, or West Bank Palestinians who seek to live inside Israel with their Israeli spouses, it prioritizes not Jewish demography but human decency. It takes pride in the birth of any new Israeli, whether he’s named Yosef or Yusuf, and seeks to give him an equal shot in life. It categorically rejects schemes to divest Palestinian Israelis of their citizenship. And it possesses the self-confidence to publicly acknowledge that the creation of the State of Israel—like the creation of the United States and many other countries—was a profound blessing for some and a historic tragedy for others.
Jewish State Number One does a better job of preserving Israel’s large Jewish majority. But Jewish State Number Two does a better job of creating a national identity inclusive enough to survive a declining Jewish majority. Jewish State Number One is the handiwork for Benjamin Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman. The Israeli Prime Minister most supportive of Jewish State Number Two was Yitzhak Rabin, who between 1992 and 1995 doubled education spending for Palestinian citizens of Israel, ended the discrepancy between the amount Israel paid Jewish and Palestinian families per child, introduced affirmative action to boost the number of Palestinian citizens in Israel’s civil service and gave Palestinian Israeli parties an unofficial role in his government. Rabin’s death,explained Palestinian Israeli Knesset member Abdul Wahad Darawashe, “was the first time when Arabs mourned a Zionist leader” because Rabin “was the first and only [Zionist] leader who recognized the injustices of the past and actually worked to amend them…There was no [other] prime minister who looked at Arab politicians the way he did - face to face. That had an effect on the entire Arab street.”
What would happen were Abbas asked to recognize Jewish State Number Two? I don’t know. But I’d like to believe that if Israel’s leaders, following in Rabin’s path, made clear not only in words but in deeds that a Jewish state can safeguard the Jewish people while also dedicating itself to the full equality and dignity of all its people, Abbas’ opposition might soften.
Either way, the important thing isn’t whether non-Israelis endorse the idea of a Jewish state. It’s whether Israelis create a Jewish state worth endorsing. Wouldn’t it be nice if Benjamin Netanyahu devoted some energy to that?
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Wednesday, March 12, 2014

A Jewish state: It’s our problem, not theirs

A Jewish state: It’s our problem, not theirs

One cannot enter a negotiation without a clear sense of one’s red lines, the deal-breakers, those issues over which compromise is intolerable. When these red lines lead to a breakdown in the talks, there is neither room nor grounds for self-criticism or self-blame. The purpose of a deal-breaker is to be precisely that – to delineate the issues which if compromised would result in unacceptable harm

It is critical, however, that one not only delineate one’s red lines, but even more importantly, think very carefully and strategically in determining their identity. It is OK and at times necessary to reject a deal and walk away, despite the consequences of such an act. Careful thought in advance ensures that one does so, only because the consequences of accepting the deal are more severe. A skilled negotiator always keeps these two consequences in his or her mind and is careful to avoid a misplaced red line, which instead of protecting, generates greater harm.

In our negotiations with the Palestinians, the purpose of our red lines is to ensure that a withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and the formation of a Palestinian state not undermine our legitimate security concerns or our identity as a Jewish state. I will leave to others far more knowledgeable than I to debate the necessity and nature of Palestinian demilitarization, a presence in the Jordan Valley, the exact demarcation of the border, and the like. Our defense and security experts do not agree on the specifics, but most of Israel is united against a deal which neither recognizes nor attempts to address these security concerns. In fact, I believe that a significant part of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s longstanding popularity lies precisely in the fact that the vast majority of Israelis from across the political spectrum trust his instincts and commitment to properly define and preserve our security red lines.
I want to focus on our other red lines, those meant to protect and preserve the identity of Israel as a Jewish state. There are many sub-issues to these red lines, from the necessity of ending the occupation, to ensuring the demographic balance necessary for our Jewish democratic character, to our stake in Jerusalem. Over the last number of years, a new issue has emerged as a primary demand, and under Prime Minister Netanyahu, a deal-breaker: the recognition by the Palestinian Authority of Israel as a Jewish state.
At present, we know that Palestinian leadership has rejected this demand, destining the current negotiations to failure. Unto itself, if this requirement is critical to our future, the fact that it causes a breakdown should not be upsetting, saddening maybe, but not upsetting, for we have no interest in accepting a deal irrespective of its consequences. The goal of the negotiations is not to bring about Israel’s surrender, but an advancement of its deepest interests.
My problem is not with the articulation of red lines meant to ensure the future viability and vitality of Israel as a Jewish state, but rather with the particular articulation of this red line: that the Palestinians formally recognize Israel’s identity as a Jewish state. It is critical, for us, to be meticulous in the formation of our red lines and not to get bogged down in rhetoric, slogans, or self-defeating conditions.
If by recognizing Israel’s identity as a Jewish state our goal is to ensure that the Palestinians accept that the consequence of peace is that the Palestinian state is now the sole homeland of the Palestinian nation, while Israel is the homeland of Israelis, the majority of whom are members of the Jewish nation and the minority of whom are Palestinian, the importance of this red line is critical and not subject to compromise. However, it should be stated as such, and not in its “Jewish state” formulation.
There is no meaning to a peace treaty if after an agreement, Palestinians still believe that their national aspirations can be fulfilled outside of the Palestinian state, and more specifically in Israel. The core issue, red line, and deal-breaker for Israelis is that Palestinians forego their claim to a right of return into the land which constitutes the State of Israel. Palestinians need not forego their narrative about this right, just as Israelis need not forego our narrative regarding the Jewish people’s right to the ancient Land of Israel. Neither of us needs to forego our rights, but rather our claim to the actualization of those rights. This is the basic meaning of a peace treaty, the recognition of each other’s borders and foregoing of one’s claim to the other’s land.
The use of the terminology, “Jewish state,” to express the above is confusing, unhelpful, and detrimental to Israel’s basic and legitimate interests. The self-evident demand of relinquishing claims and aspirations for national fulfillment and expression in the land of one’s peace partner, is a core part of our legitimate security concerns. Without it, we will remain in a permanent state of conflict and instability. The problem with articulating it in terms of recognizing Israel as the Jewish State, is that this formulation locates the issue within the context of Israel’s Jewish identity concerns, an issue which we, the members of the Jewish nation must pursue, but which we neither need nor expect outsiders, even if they are peace partners, to share with us.
While I would not mind if the Palestinian Authority chose to recognize the Jewish character of Israel and the historic right of the Jewish people to our homeland here in Israel, their recognition of such is of no consequence to me, let alone a red line. If they in fact were willing to recognize it as such, I would be very interested in engaging in a profound dialogue with them as to their understanding of the Jewishness of Israel, an understanding that has so far eluded most Israelis.
When this security concern is couched in a language of Jewish State, we are not only confusing the issue, but harming, I believe, Israel’s interests and needs. In a negotiation, and in the arena of politics, you are only as strong as your best argument, and are harmed by your weaker ones. The frontline of our campaign must be the Palestinian desire to actualize their right of return and in so doing, defeat Israel in a bloodless war and not some vague category of Jewish statehood.
According to our Declaration of Independence, the meaning of “Jewish” in Jewish state refers to the identity of the nation for whom the State of Israel is its rightful expression of sovereignty. The parallel to Jewish state in this sense is Irish state, French state, Palestinian state, and not Christian state or Muslim state. Israel is a Jewish state not in the sense that it is where Judaism is sovereign, but where the Jewish people are the majority and consequently sovereign, all the while protecting the inalienable rights of national and religious minorities, as behooves a democracy.
While this was the intent of the founders of the country and a meaning shared by many Israelis, it is not fully understood, let alone accepted, by many other Israelis. For them, a Jewish state is where Judaism must determine much of the legal and cultural fabric of the country. It is Jewish not because it is the homeland of Jews, but the homeland of Judaism. This latter position profoundly undermines the democratic commitments of Israel, and our ability to overcome it is one of the central challenges that we face in the decade to come.
If we have yet to resolve the meaning of the term, how can we expect Palestinians to agree to it? Are they, in so doing, agreeing to the primacy of Judaism in Israel, and in so doing, destining Israeli-Palestinians to being second-class citizens in a Jewish theocracy? This interpretation, while rejected by me and possibly Prime Minister Netanyahu, is a viable interpretation, and still an unresolved debate.
When Palestinian right of return is combated through the language of Jewish statehood, we are both shifting the conversation away from the central issue and at the same time, giving the Palestinians the tools to reject our legitimate concerns.
It is possible that peace in our time is unattainable. Both sides need to relinquish some of their claims in order to enable the viability, security, and prosperity of the other. The purpose of the negotiations and red lines is for each side to test the other’s sincerity on this issue. It is not to subdue the other into accepting terminology or slogans which have nothing to do with our ability to live side-by-side in peace.
Rabbi Dr. Donniel Hartman,  President of Shalom Hartman Institute of Jerusalem


Friday, March 7, 2014

Israel today: a society without a center

Israel today: a society without a center
The clash of three sacred values − liberal Zionism, ultra-Orthodox continuity and romantic nationalism − is more dangerous for Israel’s survival than any external enemy
By Carlo Strenger Mar. 7, 2014 |
Much ink has been spilled about who has benefitted from the showdown between Yesh Atid and the ultra-Orthodox Haredim. I think that beyond this issue it is important to reflect dispassionately on what recent events teach us about Israeli society.
Research in political psychology has shown that many groups rally around sacred values that are non-negotiable: No compromise is possible about these values without the group’s feeling that its very existence is threatened. This is why people are often willing to die for these values, and why pragmatic arguments do not motivate them to compromise but generally increase their intransigence, because their core identity is at stake.
Israel today has three basic forms of sacred values that have almost no common denominator.
Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid, Labor, Hatnuah and Meretz represent liberal Zionism. In their view Jewish history shows that Jews need and are entitled to a nation-state of their own. But they also think that this state must be a liberal democracy, which means that there must be strict equality before the law independent of religion, ethnicity or gender. Many commentators have questioned the wisdom of Lapid’s insistence on the Haredim’s serving in the IDF on pragmatic grounds. They have not realized that for him equality before the law is a sacred value and that without it the Zionist project is doomed.
For the Haredim the one sacred value is the Jewish people’s eternity (Netzah Yisrael), and for them the State of Israel is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for Jewish survival. Judaism, in their view, has survived because of only one reason: that there have always been Jews who have obeyed the laws of Judaism in the strictest manner. From their point of view Israel might disappear, but without them, the Haredim, Judaism will perish.
It is crucial for Haredim that young men and women be educated in a way that will make sure that they remain embedded in Haredi society and not be exposed to external influences before they have spent a long time in the Yeshiva world, are married, have children and are basically incapable of leaving Haredi society. Many secular Jews see the Haredim as nothing but parasites and do not realize that many Haredim see army service at an early age together with secular Jews as an existential threat to their sacred values.
Then there are the romantic nationalists for whom the State of Israel is not just the homeland of the Jews, but realizes the sacred bond between the Jewish people and the Greater Land of Israel. This idea derives from the extreme European right since the late 19th century, and is fused with messianic orthodoxy in national-religious Zionism. Democracy is secondary for romantic nationalists: If the sacred bond of people and land is endangered by the principles of liberal democracy, they are willing to sacrifice them, for example by curtailing freedom of speech for left-wingers or leaving Arab citizens with limited or no political rights.
The bitterness and the violent rhetoric of Israel’s political culture are largely due to this clash of three sacred values, with sometimes extreme consequences. The settler movement has already shown that it is capable of extreme violence when the two-state solution is about to be implemented. Haredim have proven that they are willing to go to prison to avoid what they see as fatal infringements on their way of life.
Liberal Zionism is at a disadvantage because it refrains from violence and abides with the law. Many believe that liberal Zionism’s majority in Israel balances this disadvantage – but this is an illusion. Likud is no longer liberal-Zionist but has adopted romantic nationalism. Only 48 MKs, i.e. 40 percent of the Knesset, represent liberal Zionism.
As a result of this clash of sacred values, growing numbers of Israelis feel they might no longer have a place in Israel without abandoning their identity. The Belzer Hasidim have declared that they will emigrate to the U.S. if forced to serve in the IDF. Ever-growing numbers of liberal-leaning Israelis leave for Berlin, New York or Los Angeles because they feel alienated by the rule of right-wing nationalism – a development encouraged by Im Tirtzu leader Ronen Shoval’s call for left-wingers to leave the country if they can’t stand the nationalist right.
None of these developments are to be taken lightly: At this point in history the clash of sacred values is more dangerous for Israel’s survival than any external enemy.

Tuesday, March 4, 2014

Let us help you help us

Let us help you help us

With a sleight of hand, a turn of phrase, and with what appears to be a genuine expression of concern, the State of Israel has revived the notorious old ideology of shlilat ha-golah (negation of the Diaspora). The unexpected move to renew this moribund concept for a new age of Jewish history is being spearheaded jointly by the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs headed by Naftali Bennett. As it currently stands and as it has been marketed, the multimillion dollar plan uses the guise of an altruistic and philanthropic effort to essentially obliterate the self-defined and idiosyncratic identity of American Jewry, and to replace it with a version better aligned to its own self-interest.
And most surprisingly, though this effort threatens to challenge not only American Jewish self-definition but even the existing infrastructure that is already in place to support American Jewry, many American Jewish leaders and institutions appear ready to capitulate entirely to this sentiment.
How has this happened? It seems that the State of Israel recognized of late that what it perceives to be as a decline in American Jewish identity (or at least the form it recognizes), and what it perceives to be as a decline in American Jewish attachment to Israel, are major strategic problems for its own survival and thriving. If they are reading the data correctly, they may well be right. Israel benefited over its first 65 years enormously from American Jewish institutional philanthropy, from advocacy and lobbying in the American halls of power by Jewish leaders, and from the broad sensibility that Jewish survival benefited from the historically-unprecedented combination of strength under sovereignty and strength in a concentrated diaspora. And therefore if they are reading the data correctly, a strategic intervention in preserving those conditions makes a lot of sense. In this reading, however, this intervention is neither altruism nor philanthropy, but rather a self-interested instrument. And self-interested it appears to be.
This colossal initiative seeks to invest hundreds of millions of dollars into new efforts to connect American Jews to Israel through new programs sending Israelis to American college campuses and ramping up joint participation by Americans and Israelis in international development efforts (not for the purpose of actual international development, but for the cultivation of shared Jewish identity among the participants). Put differently, the initiative – which requires matching philanthropic funds from American Jews to the designated governmental funds – imagines the inflation of the Jewish Agency in Israel to become a much more central actor and operator in addressing these perceived flaws in American Jewish identity.
Some of this is perplexing on its face, such as the belief that Israeli Jewry has embodied so well and so writ large a true understanding of the confrontation between Judaism and modernity that its teenagers can self-style as the “role models” that American Jewish kids need on college campus. This is the first type of negation of American Jewishness – the belief that only if exposed to the authenticity of Israeliness will American Jewry realize its inadequacy and repent of its ways.
But it is not merely the content of this approach but the structure of the initiative itself that is problematic, and that threatens to wreak enormous havoc on the very community it is seeking to “repair.” By running the initiative itself, the Jewish Agency is ironically borrowing an American Jewish model – the Federation! – in its belief that a centrally organized approach can work more effectively than seeding its money in the open market. Meantime, this model has actually undergone massive revision here in the US, and the Jewish Agency has not caught up.
Consider this: When UJA-Federation of NY allocates millions of dollars to Israel, it outlines a number of areas that it considers its strategic priorities – be they economic empowerment, religious pluralism, minority rights, etc. It then invites and enables grantees from Israel to pursue those grants through a competitive process. Certainly an Israeli might look askance at that set of priorities and wish for different ones, but here the grant-making process is honest in its self-interested approach by a philanthropic agency. And the list of NGOs lining up to compete for these grants suggests that the open market is robust.
In contrast, all indications of this new proposed plan are that the Jewish Agency intends to direct its philanthropic intervention using its own instruments. Instead of naming its objectives, identifying actors already working in that space, and pumping its resources into the system, the Agency’s co-opting of the work itself risks undermining the very fields of Israel engagement, peoplehood education, and connectivity between American Jews and Israeli Jews that it seeks to strengthen.
After all, what could be worse for the field than making an Israeli bureaucracy the key locus for this work? What could be more paralyzing than the tying of American Jewish identity work to coalition politics and the Israeli political system, as has already materialized in the bickering between the Ministries of Diaspora Affairs and Foreign Affairs? And what could be more destabilizing than the introduction of this quasi-governmental behemoth into a fundraising market that is already cluttered with well-meaning agencies competing for dollars?
And let us not forget, this all operates under the assumption that the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency have actually interpreted the data about American Jewish life correctly. The very phrase “Pew Study” has become a meaningless litmus test for the affirmation of previously held views and biases about the current state of Jewish life. No one knows the future, but many good organizations – mine included – are working to promote deep and thick Judaism that is in dialogue with the major trends that define Jewish life in America, sometimes with and sometimes against the currents. But this paternalistic approach of the State of Israel belies its deep distrust in all that is good, working and interesting in American Jewish life, in favor of promoting a type of American Jewishness that will align with its own interests.
I wish that the key players would consider a different approach forward. It is called “appreciative inquiry.” A true sense of Jewish peoplehood would seek to understand what is different and still in common in expressions of Jewish identity as it manifests in different places, and would ask: how do we cultivate that sensibility for the betterment of our relationship, even if it requires that certain characteristics of the other community may never change? It would ask, how do we support the efforts underway that understand American Jewishness better than we can from so many miles away, not only because they will be more successful but because that approach is so much more respectful?
To Minister Bennett and your colleagues, I implore you: there is much to celebrate in the current and future state of Jewish life in America. This is not to say that the fears you have are unfounded about certain aspects of Jewish life that need to be cultivated for the long-term health of the State of Israel and the relationship between Jews here and Jews there. But if you actually have these resources at your disposal, look for what is good and what is working in line with these strategic priorities, and – as our Federation system already does in sending dollars to Israel – invest in the native efforts that already understand this climate and are already working towards the advancement of the same values. Otherwise, you will do more damage than good.
written by Dr. Yehuda Kurtzer, President of The Shalom Hartman Institute of North America,

Jewish leaders in Crimea back Ukrainian government, call for Russian withdrawal

Jewish leaders in Crimea back Ukrainian government, call for Russian withdrawal

Despite graffiti attack on Crimean synagogue, local rabbi labels talk of anti-Semitism 'exaggerated.'

By  Mar. 3, 2014 


SIMFEROPOL – The Russian invasion of Crimea has also affected the local Jewish community. Synagogues in the cities of Simferopol and Sevastopol were closed this weekend due to security concerns. Last Thursday night, vandals sprayed “Death to the Zhids [Jews]” on the entrance to the Ner Tamid Reform synagogue in Simferopol.
“I have no idea who could be behind it,” said Rabbi Misha Kapustin, who couldn’t discount the possibility that the attack had been carried out to smear the Ukrainian government.
Despite many residents of the Crimean capital openly welcoming the Russian army and calling for a breakaway from Ukraine, Rabbi Kapustin took the rare step of starting a petition against the Russian occupation.
“Many here are against the Russians but are afraid to talk,” he said. “I am a Ukrainian citizen and want to live in democratic Ukraine. The government has always provided protection for the Jews, and all the talk of anti-Semitism is exaggerated. The Russians have invaded illegally and that must be opposed. So far, people have encouraged me and I don’t believe my petition will cause any harm to the Jews.”
Official Russian spokespeople and Kremlin-controlled media have repeatedly accused the pro-Western interim government in Kiev of harboring “anti-Semites” and “neo-Nazis,” putting the Jews in Ukraine in an awkward position where if they warn of actual anti-Semitism they could be aiding Russian propaganda.
This week, Jewish leaders aligned themselves firmly with the government and against the Russian invasion. Ukraine’s chief rabbi, Yaakov Bleich, signed – along with other Ukrainian religious leaders – an open letter calling upon Russia to “stop its aggression against Ukraine” and withdraw its army from Crimea.
The letter called upon Russians and Ukrainians not to “believe the propaganda that inflames hostility between us.”
Another prominent Jewish leader coming out in support of the government is oligarch and PrivatBank owner Igor Kolomoisky, whose wealth is a reported $3.5 billion. Kolomoisky accepted the emergency governorship of the Dnipropetrovsk province in eastern Ukraine, an area where there is a lot of pro-Russian sentiment.
The Jewish billionaire Victor Pinchuk was offered the governorship of Zaporizhia, but declined the post. The appointment is part of a wider government effort to retain control of the eastern provinces, but is also seen as an attempt to counter the continuing Russian accusations of anti-Semitism within the new Ukrainian government.

Monday, March 3, 2014

Settler group Elad edges closer to controlling Western Wall, despite protests

Settler group Elad edges closer to controlling Western Wall, despite protests

Jerusalem District Court approves agreement that will transfer control of Jerusalem 

Archaeological Park and the Davidson Center to the Elad-City of David Foundation.

By  Mar. 3, 2014 | 
Despite harsh opposition from the cabinet secretary, it seems the move to transfer control of the Jerusalem
Archaeological Park and the Davidson Center to the Elad-City of David Foundation – which includes the
entire southern section of the Western Wall – is proceeding.
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Last week, the Jerusalem District Court approved a compromise agreement between two government
subsidiaries – the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of
Jerusalem (JQDC, the current owner) and the Company for Reconstruction and Development of East
 Jerusalem – which would transfer control of the area to Elad. Under the agreement, Elad would cover the
rental costs for the JQDC, and in turn receive full control of the site from April 1.
In the coming days, all 25 employees at the site will receive termination letters. They are expected to be
reemployed by Elad, according to the agreement between Elad and the JQDC, for at least one additional year.
Transferring control of the site to Elad has aroused concern among leaders of non-Orthodox Jewish groups,
who have been in negotiations with the government over the last year regarding creating an alternative
prayer site close to the Western Wall that would allow for non-Orthodox or alternative prayer.
The heads of the Reform and Conservative movements stated that if Elad is granted control of the key site,
 it would effectively end the “Sharansky agreement,” which led to the construction of an alternative prayer
 site within the archaeological park (a reference to a compromise on the Western Wall outlined by Jewish
Agency chairman Natan Sharansky last year).
According to the non-Orthodox leaders, during negotiations regarding the site, they were promised that the
archaeological park would remain under government control, and that they themselves would be partners in
running the site.
These recent developments apparently contradict messages sent to the non-Orthodox leaders by Cabinet
Secretary Avichai Mendelblit, in which he stated that the transfer would not happen. Mendelblit is currently
in Washington with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and meetings regarding the subject are scheduled to
 be held.
The leader of the Conservative Movement in the United States sent a rare letter to Mendelblit, stating that if
Elad gains control over the site, the movement will pull out of negotiations with the Israeli government
regarding the prayer area. “It is infuriating and unacceptable to find that while this negotiation was going on,
other negotiations were taking place to put us under the authority of a group with a right-wing, Orthodox
religious point of view,” read the letter.
An Elad representative stated that the organization would respect any agreements reached by the
government and any groups wishing to pray at the site.

Netanyahu in Washington: It takes three to dance the Mideast tango

Netanyahu in Washington: It takes three to dance the Mideast tango
Prime minister to meet Kerry, Obama and Biden on Monday, and is scheduled to address the AIPAC conference on Tuesday.
By Haaretz | Mar. 3, 2014 | 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived late Sunday in Washington, where he was scheduled to meet U.S. President Barack Obama and
address the AIPAC conference.
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Upon landing, Netanyahu told reporters that he was committed to negotiations for a final settlement and was waiting to see proof that the
Palestinians were as well.
"It takes at least three to dance the Middle East tango," Netanyahu said. "Two are already there – Israel and the U.S. Now we need to see if the
Palestinians are also on board. In any case, in order to reach an agreement, we need to stand firm on our crucial interests. I've proven that I'm
doing that, against all pressure and all uncertainty, and I'll continue to do that here as well."
In an interview with Bloomberg's Jeffrey Goldberg published Sunday, Obama sent an unusually blunt message to Netanyahu, telling him that
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was the most moderate leader Israel would encounter in the foreseeable future and that time
was running out for a peace deal. Obama, according to Goldberg, gave the impression that Netanyahu was the one who had to be flexible in
order to advance the peace talks.
"There comes a point where you can't manage this anymore, and then you start having to make very difficult choices," Obama said. "Do you
resign yourself to what amounts to a permanent occupation of the West Bank? Is that the character of Israel as a state for a long period of time?
Do you perpetuate, over the course of a decade or two decades, more and more restrictive policies in terms of Palestinian movement? Do you
place restrictions on Arab Israelis in ways that run counter to Israel's traditions?"
Netanyahu is scheduled to meet with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on Monday morning prior to his meeting with the president and with
Vice President Joe Biden following that. On Tuesday morning he is due to address the annual convention of the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, after
which he will fly to Los Angeles.
Before taking off for Washington, Netanyahu tried to relay a harsh message on his upcoming meeting with the U.S. president: "I'll stand firm on
the State of Israel's crucial interests, first and foremost the security of the citizens of Israel," he said. "In recent years, the State of Israel has
been subject to pressures, but we have pushed through the storm and the regional tempest, and that's how it will continue to be."